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Abstract: Wing-Chung Ho offers an extensive critique of what he calls our 
“radical constructionist approach to family experience,” questioning the 
theoretical validity and empirical utility of the research program. This article 
responds to the charges in the broader context of the program's 
constructionist analytics, discussing family's experiential location, 
organizational embeddedness, and the importance of ethnographic sensibility. 
A brief extract of situated talk and interaction is presented to illustrate the 
discursive complexity and institutional bearings of family as a category of 
experience. The conclusion takes up the issue of whether the program is 
radical in conceptualization and empirical realization. 
While now in the scientific mainstream, social constructionism 
remains enigmatic, if not troublesome, to some scholars and 
researchers. Of course, constructionism is not a singular project (see 
Holstein and Gubrium 2008b), which may invite the confusion or 
misunderstanding. Perhaps, the most common complaint appears in 
accusations of radical relativism—of charges that constructionism 
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promotes a sense that “anything goes” when it comes to the 
meaningful formulation of experience, that social reality is “just” a 
social construction (see, for example, Best 2000). 
Wing-Chung Ho (2012) joins the critics, offering an extensive 
commentary on what he calls “radical constructionism,” favoring 
instead theoretical choices grounded in Alfred Schutz's social 
phenomenology and Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. He takes as 
his exemplar of “a more sophisticated approach” the constructionist 
analytics we have applied to the study of family (see, for example, 
Gubrium and Holstein 1990 and Holstein and Gubrium 1995).1 The gist 
of Ho's critique is that our research program is a form of 
postmodernism or radical constructionism, which insists that “social 
reality is constituted more by the actor's usage of discourse than 
shaped by the social structure which is said to be fixed and static” (Ho 
2012:322).2 In effect, he argues that the program lacks substance. It 
is an old critique harkening back to the well-worn structure versus 
agency problem. 
Much of Ho's description of what we have published is on target. 
He writes (Ho 2012:326), for example, that we hold that “the meaning 
of family is not something fixed once and for all; and the family 
experience is derived from discourse and its relation to the conditions 
of everyday life (Gubrium and Holstein 1990).” He notes (Ho 
2012:326) that we suggest that “the essence of family is found in the 
way family is used, not in conventional or idealized social forms. 
Moreover, discursive practice becomes the vehicle which mediates the 
construction of family meaning and domestic reality” (Holstein and 
Gubrium 1999:7). Perhaps, he overstates our motivations (Ho 
2012:325–326): “Holstein and Gubrium (1994:265) set out to strip 
the traces of modernist sociology which sustains ‘the’ family as an 
abstract, idealized social form.” 
Ho's reservations about our brand of constructionism derive 
from two sources. First, he decries what he claims is our insistence on 
the “primordial” status of discursive practice vis-à-vis social structure, 
background expectancies, habitus, or other allegedly nondiscursive 
factors that influence the organization of social forms. Second, he 
discounts the validity of our approach because we have not been 
sufficiently faithful to two sources of inspiration: Alfred Schutz and 
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Harold Garfinkel. Vehemently, Ho argues (p. 323) that our model of 
the social construction process—and by implication, our empirical 
methods—are “theoretically problematic and only of limited empirical 
utility.”“In short,” he later repeats, “the radical constructionism put 
forth by Gubrium and Holstein has failed to offer a model with high 
theoretical validity and empirical utility . . .” (p. 335)—hefty charges 
that require solid answers. 
This article responds to Ho's assessment by reiterating the 
program's dimensions and scope, which extend beyond family to any 
and all social forms, something which Ho acknowledges but 
marginalizes (see, for example, Gubrium and Buckholdt 1982; Holstein 
and Gubrium 2000a). At the heart of the program—and apparently our 
disagreement with Ho—is the notion that the social construction 
process involves discursive activity as well as interpretive resources, 
circumstances, and conditions, and that neither warrants analytic 
primacy. Pursuing this theme, we address both the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of Ho's critique. Because we see these as 
interrelated, it is ultimately impossible to discuss them separately. But 
for purposes of presenting a cogent response, we will proceed by 
addressing the theoretical validity charge first and then turn to the 
charge about the limited empirical utility of the program. 
Theoretical Validity 
The conceptual groundings of the social construction process 
have been hotly debated for over a half century. Ho taps into these 
debates offering a view that is considerably at odds with our sense of 
the process. 
The Primacy of Discursive Practice 
Part of Ho's charge of theoretical invalidity is his claim (p. 331) 
that “Gubrium and Holstein need to make explicit their theoretical 
position on whether they consider discursive practice or the local 
aspects of discursive environments as more primordial in constituting 
reality. Gubrium and Holstein would definitely opt for the discursive.” 
We find this puzzling in light of the way we have consistently 
articulated our position on the issue, one made clear in the many 
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family-related as well as nonfamily-specific sources Ho cites (and often 
fairly summarizes).3 Rather than dissecting and refuting Ho's claim, we 
opt for simply pointing out pertinent aspects of our program. 
Many constructionist controversies have centered on the relative 
primacy of communicative versus contextual factors in the social 
construction process (see Holstein and Miller 1993, 2003; Holstein and 
Gubrium 2008b). In our view, such arguments presume a false 
dichotomy between discursive activity and the circumstances involved 
in the construction process. Ho explicitly draws this distinction. He 
argues that the “prepredicative structure of the lifeworld, the pre-
constituted stock of knowledge”—concepts borrowed from Schutz—are 
primordial factors of the construction of meaningful experience. 
(However, it is not clear throughout his commentary whether he takes 
this to be conventional social structure or prepredicative structure, 
implicating his understanding of phenomenology.) By primordial, we 
take Ho to mean primary or fundamental, although the term also 
connotes the source or point of origin. 
We have argued for years that reality construction is centered in 
the real-time, practical work of everyday life, implicating both 
constructive activity and the resources and conditions of construction. 
(See, for example, Gubrium and Holstein 1997:114–22). This 
argument appears in almost all our publications cited in Ho's 
commentary.) In taking this position, we have carefully sought to 
avoid drawing a stark distinction between the two. Rather, we have 
repeatedly chosen terms such as “reflexive,”“intertwined,”“mutually 
constitutive,”“dialectical,” and “interplay” to describe the relationship 
of the two dimensions of the construction process.4 
Reality construction, we have noted repeatedly, is a craft-like 
process of reflexively articulating in situ meaning with experience to 
give related actions their sense of substantiality. We have used the 
term “interpretive practice” to convey both the artfully discursive and 
substantive aspects of this process. Broadly, it refers to the 
constellation of procedures, conditions, and resources through which 
reality is apprehended, understood, organized, and represented in the 
course of everyday life (see Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Holstein 
1993). Interpretive practice links the categorically artful, the concrete, 
and the discursive: 
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People conduct their lives in diverse social circumstances, 
encountering reality in myriad forms. Cultural conventions and 
institutional settings specify possible complexes of meanings 
and definitions which serve as interpretive resources, promoting 
some interpretations, impinging upon others. While this 
configuration of whats does not determine the course of talk and 
interaction, it makes it understandable in its related 
terms. . . . [Applicable] frameworks do not strictly govern 
interpretations; rather, they provide participants with familiar 
and accountable ways of representing conditions and concerns. 
In effect, the potentially real is sorted for what will be taken to 
be the actual, using the resources at hand. Local interpersonal 
engagements serve as the interactional scaffolding and 
definitional venues for this interpretive work, both configuring 
the hows and implicating the whats of interpretation. . . . In 
everyday experience, the representational is the other side of 
the real. Interpretive practice gives us the real-in-the-
making. . . . The real-in-the-making relies upon representational 
methods, what ethnomethodologists call “practical reasoning” 
(Garfinkel 1967). But these hows of reality construction are 
enduringly linked with what is under construction because 
interpretive practice unfolds within practical definitional 
circumstances. So, while interpretive practice is actively 
constitutive, if it were conceived exclusively in interactionally 
artful terms, it would seem to be out of place and time, without 
the interpretive building blocks that reality construction 
demands. (Gubrium and Holstein 1997:114–15) 
The reflexivity of the artfully methodical and the substantive 
sides of reality construction is a key to our program. Discursive 
activity, on the one hand, and discursive resources and conditions, on 
the other, are mutually constitutive. Each inevitably involves the other. 
We have variously described discursive activity as employing 
vocabularies, schemes of interpretation, background expectations, 
collective representations, stocks of knowledge, local cultures, 
language games, institutional environments, and discourses—along 
with other related concepts—that have, from time to time, become 
working parts of our analytic vocabulary. These are all aspects of the 
contexts of interpretation that must be actively, situationally 
articulated to render experience sensible, orderly, and meaningful. 
Without these resources, discursive activity conveys nothing; it is 
empty and, as such, unrecognizable. 
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At the same time, interpretive conditions and resources are 
methodically inserted into reality construction; they do not simply 
assert themselves behind the backs or outside the purview of social 
actors. These substantive aspects of interpretation are themselves 
constituted by way of social interaction, built up in the practical give-
and-take of everyday life. Ongoing interaction produces enduring 
social patterning in part because there are patterns in what is 
patterned and in part because patterning is informed by patterns. 
Conceiving the two facets of social construction to be in 
opposition or competition with each other is anathema from our point 
of view. We use an analytic vocabulary 
that dialectically acknowledges, accommodates, and explicates 
both sides of the process, while remaining sensitive to the ways 
in which the two sides are inseparable. Moreover, given the 
reflexivity of constructive activity and contextual resources, it 
would be futile and pointless to try to establish the primacy of 
one over the other. (Gubrium and Holstein 1997:118) 
Conceptually explicit, we have extended the phenomenological 
concept of bracketing to formulate a working procedure called 
“analytic bracketing” as a methodological guideline (see, for example, 
Gubrium and Holstein 1997, 2009; Holstein and Gubrium 2008a, 
2011). Throughout the analytic process, the researcher alternately 
orients to everyday realities as both the products of members' reality-
constructing activities and as realizations of interpretive resources and 
conditions from which realities are reflexively constituted: “At one 
moment, the researcher may be relatively indifferent to the 
interpretive contexts of everyday life in order to document their 
production through discursive practice. In the next analytic move, he 
or she brackets discursive practice in order to assess the local 
availability, distribution, and/or regulation of resources for reality 
construction” (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011:347; also see Holstein and 
Gubrium 2004). 
Analytic bracketing is no more specific than that; it amounts to 
an orienting procedure for alternately focusing on both the active and 
substantive sides of the construction process in order to assemble both 
a contextually scenic and a contextually constitutive picture of the 
reality under construction. The objective is to move back and forth 
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between aspects of the process, documenting each in turn, and 
making informative references to the other. Either discursive 
machinery or available conditions, resources, and constraints become 
the provisional phenomenon, while interest in the other is temporarily 
deferred but not forgotten. The analysis of the constant interplay 
between aspects of the construction process mirrors the lived interplay 
between social interaction and its immediate surroundings, resources, 
and institutional contexts (see also Holstein and Gubrium 2003, 
2008b; Gubrium and Holstein 2009). 
This position is direct and plentiful across 25 years of 
publication. Early on, certainly, it was less fully developed, but its 
emerging presence and evolution were evident in the program from 
the outset even in the sources Ho cites. The book What Is Family? 
(Gubrium and Holstein 1990), for example, was a key publication in 
the family area. Well before we formed the idea of analytic bracketing, 
our concern for reflexivity was apparent. 
Family discourse, then, is both substantive and active. In terms 
of substance, we can think of its terminology, ideas, models, 
and theories as resources for both naming and making sense of 
interpersonal relations. . . . Family discourse is also active. Used 
in relation to concrete social relations, it communicates how one 
intends to look at, how one should understand, or what one 
aims to do about what is observed. . . . If discourse assigns 
meaning . . . life's potential meanings are limited to the 
discourses available. (Gubrium and Holstein 1990:15–16) 
Throughout the book, discussion oscillates between the active 
and the substantive, alternately engaging topics such as family 
discourse, family usage, privileged knowledge in practice, 
organizational embeddedness, and local culture. At no point in our 
publications have we specified a primordial concern for a particular 
component of the construction process. We consistently write 
something along the following lines: “The components are viewed as 
mutually constitutive; each reflexively depends upon and incorporates 
the other. Consequently one can't argue that analysis should 
necessarily begin or end with any particular component” (Gubrium and 
Holstein 2009:29). This caveat appears in nearly every methodological 
text we have produced since 1997 (see, for example, Gubrium and 
Holstein 1997, 2000; Holstein and Gubrium 2003, 2005, 2008a, 
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2011). We thus find it hard to understand the basis for Ho's claim that 
we “definitely opt for the discursive” over the more substantive or 
contextual. 
In his critique, Ho refers to comments on What Is Family? by 
Pierre Bourdieu (1996). Quoting Bourdieu at length, Ho reiterates his 
argument regarding the limits of the discursive in slightly different 
terms, highlighting in support of that one of Bourdieu's signature 
constructs: habitus. Writing about the construction of family as a well-
founded social fiction, Bourdieu (and by association, Ho) suggests that 
the family 
is a common principle of vision and division, a nomos, that we 
all have in our heads because it has been inculcated in us 
through a process of socialization performed in a world that was 
itself organized according to the division into families. This 
principle of construction is one of the constituent elements of 
our habitus, a mental structure which, having been inculcated 
into all brains socialized in a particular way, is both individual 
and collective. It is a tacit law (nomos) of perception and 
practice that is at the basis of the consensus on the sense of the 
social world (and of the word “family” in particular), the basis of 
common sense. (Bourdieu 1996:21; original emphases and 
bracket. Cited in Ho 2012) 
While Ho turns to Bourdieu to underscore the claim that the 
prepredicative (i.e., the conventionally structural) is primordial, 
Bourdieu's support is not wholly compelling. By invoking the notion of 
habitus, Ho and Bourdieu apparently assign the primary force in the 
construction of family to originary mental structures. “Family,” from 
this stance, becomes a set of laws for perception that dictate 
“consensus” on what, in reality, family is (Bourdieu 1996:21). Of 
course, the empirical world often confounds this consensus. For 
example, a commonly noted feature of contemporary social life (at 
least in the West) has been the alleged proliferation of diverse family 
forms (see Stacey 1990, 1992, cited in Ho 2012). With a well-
developed habitus, nomos, or consensus, how is this possible? There is 
no specification for how, when, where, or if particular laws of 
perception might be invoked. In other words, there is little said about 
their lived application, how habitus interjects itself into lived 
experience in practice.5 
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While Bourdieu seems to assert the preeminence of mental 
structures or primordial categories, his general concern for a related 
reflexivity (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) appears to undermine 
Ho's unequivocal assertion of the primacy of the prepredicative. 
Writing about the family as a prenotion of common sense, for 
example, Bourdieu argues that: 
common sense and the folk categories of spontaneous 
sociology . . . (may) be well-founded, because they help to 
make things, because they help to make the reality that they 
describe. In the social world, words make things, because they 
make the consensus on the existence and the meaning of 
things, the common sense, the doxa accepted by all as self-
evident. (Bourdieu 1996:21; original emphasis and brackets) 
It is evident in Bourdieu's scheme of things that the discursive is 
important: “words make things.” Indeed, Bourdieu (1996) goes on to 
suggest a reflexive relationship between categories and their 
realization that echoes our own position. 
In a kind of circle, the native category, having become a 
scientific category for demographers, sociologists and especially 
social workers who, like official statisticians, are invested with 
the capacity to work on reality, to make reality, helps to give 
real existence to that category. The family discourse that 
ethnomethodologists refer to is a powerful, performative 
discourse, which has the means of creating the conditions of its 
own verification and therefore its own reinforcement, an 
institutional discourse which durably institutes itself in reality.6 
(p. 25) 
Ultimately, Ho's contention that the prepredicative is primordial 
is dubious in the context of his declared theoretical allegiances. Ho's 
usage throughout the commentary suggests that his position is not 
phenomenological but rather borders on the conventionally structural. 
On this front, it would appear that our ethnomethodologically informed 
sense of the prepredicative is more theoretically valid than Ho's. 
Neither Schutz nor ethnomethodologists build their ideas and work on 
a conventionally structural basis; rather, they set that aside in order to 
understand and describe how structures are assembled and sustained. 
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Theoretical Fealty 
This brings us to the issue of theoretical fealty. Ho's view seems 
to be that theoretical validity requires strict allegiance to particular 
conceptual dogmas. His critique of our program derives from a sense 
that our constructionist analytics has not been faithful to Schutz and 
Garfinkel. Perhaps, a limited mea culpa may be in order here. Across 
our writings, we have expressed great appreciation for Schutz and 
Garfinkel, as well as many others, including but not limited to Emile 
Durkheim, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, George Herbert 
Mead, Erving Goffman, Everett Hughes, C. Wright Mills, Melvin Pollner, 
D. Lawrence Wieder, and Dorothy Smith. As much as we borrow from 
them for our own use, we have been careful to avoid doctrinaire 
arguments or appeals to particular versions of sociological faith to 
bolster our perspective. Indeed, we tend to use phrases like 
“phenomenological background,”“ethnomethodological sensibilities,” 
and “Foucauldian inspirations” to characterize simultaneously our 
intellectual debts and to imply that we do not take sources of 
inspiration to heart wholesale. Perhaps, we have been promiscuous in 
our attempt to draw from perspectives as diverse as Garfinkel's and 
Foucault's to understand the social construction process (see Holstein 
and Gubrium 2000b). That is a risk we have chosen. For us, abiding 
adherence to a particular dogma or set of ideas has little appeal. 
Ho is shortsighted on this front. He does not seem to realize 
that most intellectual histories develop or even change course over 
time, making theoretical fealty moot in the first place. Is Ho's standard 
of validity Garfinkel's early work, for example, or later developments 
of his ideas? We have also borrowed from Goffman (to be fair to Ho, 
he is not concerned with Goffman), but the issue of fealty might be 
raised there too. Is our program more inspired by the Goffman of The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) or the Goffman of Frame 
Analysis (1974)? There is a difference in substance and emphasis. 
As we alluded to earlier, there is also the question of whether 
Ho's view of Schutz and Garfinkel is correct to begin with. We tread 
lightly here, because we are well aware that any theoretical 
formulation is subject to interpretation, commonly producing 
exegetics. In our work, we have featured the everyday dimensions of 
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the construction process, which we believe Schutz and Garfinkel also 
spotlight. Both are distinctly social in their views. Curiously enough, Ho 
argues that Schutz and Garfinkel primarily concentrate on the 
mentalistic, cognitive components of social construction. Oddly, too, 
Ho argues (p. 329) that Garfinkel was most interested in the 
“background expectancies of everyday life . . . which constitute the 
conditions under which discourse becomes understandable to actors.” 
Diverse readings of the classics are plentiful, and we will not 
quibble with Ho about what Schutz or Garfinkel really meant or 
intended.7 We will point out, however, that our long-standing use of 
terms centered on discursive conditions and resources—local cultures, 
schemes of interpretation, collective representations, and the like—
sound suspiciously like the concepts Ho places at the heart of Schutz' 
and Garfinkel's enterprises (and indicts us for slighting). At the same 
time, these intellectual sources probably would not have anticipated 
the ways in which we ourselves have built upon their ideas. Our 
borrowings have been selective and certainly involved modification. 
We have avoided claims of synthesis opting rather for a strategy of 
playing one conceptual source against another to gain analytic 
leverage on the complex process of social construction (see Gubrium 
and Holstein 1997; Holstein and Gubrium 2000b, for example). 
Theoretical fealty has never been the underlying aim of our program. 
Empirical Utility 
Ho also charges that the program is of limited empirical utility, 
which ostensibly refers to its value for understanding family 
empirically. We will respond to this charge in three ways. First is the 
issue of how we view family as a social form. Second, we address the 
matter of experiential location and the need for ethnographic 
sensibility. Third, we provide a brief empirical example from field 
material that demonstrates the utility of the approach for documenting 
the constructive fluidity of family as a social form. 
Family as a Category of Experience 
To start, it is important to explain our use of the term 
“family.”What Is Family? (Gubrium and Holstein 1990) deliberately put 
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the question in terms of “family,” not “the family.” We avoided the 
article “the” because of the risk of framing the question in terms of an 
ontological space independent of lived experience. Being independent, 
the family would exist “silently” (Ho's wording), suffusing everyday life 
whether or not it was recognized and spoken of as such. Precise 
definition and descriptions of covariations in the family's components, 
influences, or outcomes would be the research goals. The overall aim 
would be to represent the family as objectively as possible over and 
above the everyday epistemological texture of lived experience. 
Unfortunately, casting the space as primordial can easily lead to the 
debunking of lived experience, including the disparagement of 
discursivity (see Woolgar and Pawluch 1985). 
Schutz and ethnomethodology do not quarrel with this 
ontological space but rather set it aside in order to discern and 
document what in lived experience makes it possible. They neither 
assert nor question the space. Ethnomethodology in particular would 
technically bracket ontological concerns with the family as the starting 
point of concrete research in order to foreground empirically the lived 
operations or mechanisms that produce and sustain the sense of a 
separate and distinct reality (see Pollner 1987). The aim is not to deny 
the existence of social forms such as the family but rather to treat 
them as “anthropologically strange” for the purpose of documenting 
real-time methods of reality construction. It is a procedural, not an 
ontological move. 
Ho is impatient with our approach, which also sets the space 
aside procedurally in order, in our case, to document family's 
constructed reality. Ho claims that our program is “postmodern” 
because it casts ontological doubt on the family, rendering the family 
merely discursive—ephemeral, if nonexistent. He signals his 
annoyance by citing Richard Day's (2007) characterization of 
postmodernism as “vague [and] ethereal” and those who practice it as 
“wispy.” But, Ho is mistaken about our position. If family, in our view, 
is constructively fluid, this does not mean it is nonexistent. Nor are the 
methods applied for researching it inappropriate or lacking in 
empirically rigor. (Indeed, the methods are empirically radical if the 
word “empirical” is understood in its original experiential connotation.) 
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Ho also fails to understand our modification of the 
ethnomethodological project. We accept it up to a point, which is why 
we claim Schutz and ethnomethodology as influences on, not 
imprimaturs of, our approach. We also find utility in unbracketing the 
space, not to champion a primordial reality but to bring into view 
empirically the conditions of possibility for family usage as a category 
of experience. Where then does this leave “family”? Bracketed, it 
becomes a categorical space filled with the methods of reality 
construction. Unbracketed, it becomes the concrete landscape of the 
familial, a space filled with endless formal and informal configurations 
of domesticity. As endless unbracketed depictions have shown, 
“family” has been with us for a long time and is now said to be taking 
shape in myriad ways. 
Our view of family as a category of experience puts the 
empirical accent on the interplay of the bracketed and the 
unbracketed—on the respective hows and whats of family life. Yes, 
family life is there, so to speak, and has been there for a long time. 
But, it is experientially significant as a matter of family sui generis only 
when it becomes categorically relevant as such. We may go on for 
years living as kindred in the same household—brushing our teeth, 
disciplining our children, watching television, being bored, eating 
meals, arguing with each other, happily celebrating holidays together, 
and becoming estranged, among the endless activities we engage 
there. But, we may never have a categorical sense that we do all of 
these things as family matters or as kinds of families. The analytic 
issue for us is and always has been centered on the question of how 
these endless activities become matters of family life, sui generis. It is 
a way of working out Emile Durkheim's alleged aphorism (cf. Garfinkel 
2002). As the anecdote at the start of What Is Family? suggests, we 
can brush our teeth, watch television, and quarrel in many places, 
even with kindred, but is that family? These activities could just as 
well be categorized as tyranny, injustice, equality, benevolence, and 
“just living there,” among many other things, not family at all. 
If not inculcated in our brains, family comes up repeatedly in 
life, at times very loudly in talk and interaction. But whether it is more 
categorically relevant in the household than in other places is another 
matter. Borrowing Ho's term, it has been our view that family 
“silences” are broken more outside the home than within—in schools, 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 53, No. 3 (2012): pg. 341-359. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been granted 
for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
14 
 
law offices, courtrooms, and counseling sessions, among diverse 
locations that empirically give voice to the family presumed to 
primordially occupy the home. Extending beyond the hows of family 
construction, our program has sought to understand when and where 
the categorical talk of family comes up, how that talk is organized, and 
what the consequences are for those concerned. To argue about a 
child's unbrushed teeth as a matter of hygiene is one thing; to frame it 
as a matter of responsible parenting in a divorce proceeding is quite 
another. The latter can produce a highly audible family, but outside 
the physical confines of the household, a point we take up next. 
Ethnographic Sensibility 
Ho elides an important contemporary dimension of the whats of 
family: the element of experiential location. By experiential location, 
we are referring to where (and when) matters in question, such as 
brushing teeth, are categorized as family issues. Ho's oversight is 
peculiar since experiential location is a prominent theme of What Is 
Family?, which Ho cites extensively. The book has an entire chapter 
titled “Organizational Embeddedness and Family Diversity” that deals 
with the theme. (Embeddedness refers to venues of family 
categorization. See Gubrium 1987, 1988 and Gubrium and Holstein 
1993, 2001.) Ho also ignores a related article published in the Journal 
of Marriage and Family, which is referenced in the book and that 
explicitly flags the theme and its methodological imperative, titled “The 
Private Image: Experiential Location and Method in Family Studies” 
(Gubrium and Holstein 1987). 
The location in which the discursive unfolds makes a difference 
in the interactional resources for, and categorical conditions of, the 
construction process—implicating, for example, who is involved and 
what the stakes and consequences are for those concerned. To 
construct a family as dysfunctional at a cocktail party in the vernacular 
of sarcastic psychobabble has different experiential contours, stakes, 
and consequences than the corresponding description offered in an 
involuntary commitment hearing (see Holstein 1988) or in a parent 
effectiveness training session (see Buckholdt and Gubrium [1979] 
1985). Analytically attending to the discursive alone is insufficient for 
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sorting this out; we are well aware of the empirical limits of the 
discursive. 
We developed the concepts of experiential location and 
organizational embeddedness as part of research centered on the 
social organization of troubles in institutional settings. We were 
interested in a wide range of organizations as sites for documenting 
the social construction process, including nursing homes, residential 
treatment centers for children, family therapy, involuntary 
commitment hearings, physical rehabilitation, psychiatric treatment, 
and caregiver support groups. We encountered considerable family 
usage along the way, but we also came across the construction of 
myriad other social forms, including the self, personal identity, stigma, 
gender, age, the life course, mental competence, dementia, physical 
fitness, disability, dying, and death. 
We have found the situated unfolding of the construction 
process especially compelling and have demonstrated the importance 
of cultivating ethnographic insights in studying it. Which came first, 
then, our interest in the discursive or our ethnographic sensibilities? It 
is hard to say. As the significance of experiential location for 
understanding the applications of family as a category of experience 
became evident, it seemed reasonable to take location into account in 
documenting related talk and interaction. In any case, the empirical 
utility of combining an interest in both the whats and the hows of the 
construction process became clear. Neither of us started by conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork in households, which we have always imagined 
to be a daring and difficult undertaking. Rather, our fieldwork has been 
located in settings where everyday troubles were called to professional 
attention, most of which brought the category of family to bear on 
interpreting the troubles. Key here was the idea that family usage was 
organizationally embedded; the settings in view varied enormously in 
how family was understood and how it was claimed to figure in the 
troubles. To borrow from Bourdieu, the settings of family usage were 
separate fields of habitus. 
Three points underscore the empirical utility of ethnographic 
sensibility. One is that time and again, it was evident empirically that 
when family members participated in the various field sites, their initial 
sense of who and what they were as family members or family writ 
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large was vague. In many instances, they were in a quandary about 
how family as a category of experience mattered at all in 
understanding their troubles. Presented troubles were concrete and 
mundane, such as how loud a TV set was played in the evening, the 
occasional verbal abuse taken by a wife from her demented husband, 
or the difficulties of managing a perennially confused adult son or 
daughter. Rarely, if ever, was family categorically assumed a priori to 
be a framework for constructing an understanding of the troubles in 
question. 
The second point is that, in contrast, particular sites outside the 
home had distinctive and clear understandings of family as a category 
of experience and how that figured in the troubles considered there. 
This could vary even in a single site where different professional 
discourses, for example, constructed family in sharp contrast with each 
other. Family was not so much in anyone's brain, as it was a range of 
discursive usages—if not a set of institutional habits—for assembling 
troubles and domestic life in particular ways. To add ethnographic 
sensibility to Schutz's otherwise apt term, we have found that the 
“stock of knowledge” that coalesces as “family-as-a-category-of-
experience” was not personal or in the brain at all. It was differentially 
distributed and applied according to the categorical possibilities of a 
virtual panorama of institutions dealing with related experiences. If 
there was the semblance of habitus in place, it had organizational 
contours and rhythms. If there were stocks of knowledge at hand, they 
were institutionally grounded. 
The third point relates to the broader field of social forms that 
Ho ignores. If family was an important category of experience across 
the institutional landscape, there were other categories that competed 
with it as a means of constructing troubles. Other social forms could 
dilute the overall centrality of family in these matters. Ho (and 
presumably Bourdieu) wonders why family comes up repeatedly as a 
category of experience if it is not primordial. To be sure, family usage 
is nearly ubiquitous in this interpretive landscape, but so are 
references to other categories of experience, including gender, age, 
race, motives, duty, authority, good and bad reasons, and self-control. 
Ethnographic sensibility is an important facet of discursive 
research because it matters empirically where and when family or 
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other social forms are used (or not used) to categorize experience. 
Ethnographic sensibility guards against overemphasizing the discursive 
by continuously sensitizing us to the scenic presence or absence of 
representational categories. While family is not always scripted in so 
many words, institutions are prepared to instruct us in its warranted 
usage, something that is not necessarily evident in decontextualized 
strips of talk and interaction. 
A Demonstration of Empirical Utility 
An example of the empirical utility of our program necessarily 
will be brief. The conversational extract presented below is 
reconstructed from one field study, part of a corpus of ethnographic 
data gathered over three decades of research in human service 
institutions (see Holstein and Gubrium 2008a; Gubrium and Holstein 
2009). Note in the extract that while family is being commonly 
referenced by both speakers to categorize experience, its preferred 
connotation varies considerably in practice. The ethnography of the 
exchange, not the exchange in its own right, makes this evident. In 
this case, ethnographic sensibility relates the talk and interaction to 
the professional perspectives in tow and their organizational linkages. 
We will use a truncated phenomenological language to make the 
argument. The discursive and the institutional combine to 
contextualize usage. Even in this short extract, the meaning of family 
as a category of experience is too complex to be captured by concepts 
such as habitus and prepredicative structures. One aspect of 
complexity stems from what systematic observation shows 
discursively, that the substance of family usage is organizationally 
embedded. A second aspect of complexity stems from the methodical 
ways speakers in the exchange translate contrasting senses of what is 
taken to be a common reality—the troubles and the family in question. 
A third aspect features the inexorable artfulness of the process. 
The field site is a residential treatment center for emotionally 
disturbed children called Cedarview. Documenting the institutional 
mediations of the social construction of disturbance was the research 
goal (Buckholdt and Gubrium [1979] 1985). At the time, emotional 
disturbance was a term widely used for what has evolved into 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or ADHD, the spectrum of 
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autisms, and Asperger's syndrome, among a range of behavior 
problem designations for children. Cedarview's treatment program 
combined an intricate behavior modification regimen with half-day 
schooling on the grounds, 24-hour residential care for a period of two 
years, counseling, speech therapy, and recreational activities. 
Because the discourse of behavior modification was 
institutionally mandated, most of the professional staff used its 
vocabulary for official purposes, applying its principles and 
justifications in their work and in their decision making. While family 
life was a constant concern, it was officially construed as a behavioral 
environment with diverse reward contingencies and outcomes. For all 
intents and purposes, family was a configuration of stimuli and 
responses, the behavioral effectiveness of which for children could lead 
to varied degrees of self-control or emotional disturbance. To use a 
familiar metaphor, family was preferably a “cool” environment, whose 
dynamics could be understood in terms of the contingent rationalities 
of visible activity. In sharp contrast with Christopher Lasch's (1979) 
contemporaneous concept of family as a “haven in a heartless world,” 
whose warm and supportive interior defended members against the 
cold realities of life, the effective family in institutional reckoning kept 
members' emotional lives under control (also see Gubrium 1992). 
At the time, psychological services at Cedarview were 
outsourced to three consultants—one was a behavioral psychologist, 
another was a psychologist who viewed himself as eclectic, and the 
third was a child psychiatrist with Freudian inclinations. Consultants 
were assigned to specific children, and to the extent possible, the 
consultants followed up only on children assigned to them. While the 
psychiatrist brought an extra-institutional perspective on family to his 
exchanges with the regular staff, his opinions and advice were 
nonetheless admired and valued, shedding light on children's 
upbringing and emotional lives. In his view, a warm and supportive 
domestic life was a key to the family's emotional health. 
If the consultants' professional vocabularies were different, 
much of what was heard in their interactions with staff members 
transpired in the vernacular. All three regularly asked questions such 
as “What's going on at home?,”“Is [she or he] getting their act 
together?,” and “What are the treatment goals here?” At first blush, 
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one would think they all were talking and consulting about the same 
thing. But, careful attention to what all concerned were doing with 
words drew a more complex picture centered on the interplay of 
discursive skill, professional vocabularies, and institutional 
preferences. 
The occasional substitution of one consultant for another in 
required semiannual psychiatric staffings was especially telling. While 
Cedarview stressed consistency in consultation, periodically one 
consultant had to take the place of another because of summer and 
holiday vacation schedules or other competing obligations. On one 
such occasion from which the extract is reconstructed, the behavioral 
psychologist substituted for the psychiatrist. As expected, as the 
child's progress in treatment was reviewed, he asked questions about 
the home and family life. When staff members, consulting the case 
record and recalling earlier reviews, referred to the child's early 
upbringing and emotional attachments, the consultant asserted his 
behavioral perspective requesting, that staff members not “get into 
[family members'] heads,”“just stick to what's going on now,” and “tell 
me how he's [the child] being consequented.” If conduct can be 
divided into thinking, feeling, and doing, the consultant had a decided 
preference for doing. As staff members followed through, the family as 
a category of experience for this particular child changed from 
something resembling the warm interior that Lasch and the consulting 
psychiatrist had in view, to something closer to cooler institutional 
reckoning. 
This was not an automatic shift in usage but entailed skillful 
translation. At virtually each and every point of reconstruction, those 
concerned, including the consultant, engaged in discussions of 
phenomenological equivalents. If a staff member recalled an 
emotionally shattered home from the last review or stated that the 
case record said such-and-such about the child's early upbringing, at 
this presiding consultant's request, the previous characterization was 
translated into behavioral equivalents. 
Note in particular in the following exchange between a social 
worker and the consultant that equivalencies are established ad hoc 
“by rule,” that is, with methodical reference to general principles that 
justify particular characterizations and accounts as equivalent (see 
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Wieder 1970). As questions are asked about what a feature of family 
that had previously been characterized as emotional means 
behaviorally, equivalencies are proffered as a way of getting on with 
the proceedings. The principles invoked provide ad hoc equivalency 
rules for practical understanding. While the exchange does not show it, 
the reverse also occurs in such proceedings, where the ad hoc rules as 
general principles of equivalency are taken as proven in the particulars 
under consideration, reflexively documenting in turn the empirical 
grounding of equivalency. 
It is also important to mention that as rule use is ad hoc, there 
is no guarantee of substantive equivalencies across these exchanges. 
The artfulness of rule use only supports the working assumption that 
the “family-there” with essential emotional and historical qualities in 
one exchange will be the “family-there” with behavioral dimensions in 
another, satisfying the common ontological understanding in place. 
The constant yet shifting prepredicative reality of the object under 
consideration is justified and warranted in discursive practice. 
Mundane as it is, the prepredicative, if not the primordial, reality of 
family is a work in continuous progress, methodical in a certain 
respect, artful in another, and silently taken for granted as real by 
those concerned for all practical purposes. 
Social worker: [Reading from the case record] Says that the 
home is pretty shattered emotionally. 
Consultant: [Offering an equivalency rule] Do you mean 
everyone's out of control? 
The consultant and social worker go on to discuss the 
phenomenological equivalency of shattered emotions and being 
out of control, offering different rules for translating the 
meaning of one into the other, eventually settling, for the time 
being, on the following rule. 
Social Worker: [Offering another rule] No, what I mean is just 
that the parents really feel bad about it and can't seem to get 
over that. Just that. It's not that things are out of control, more 
like just deep feelings. 
The discussion continues, focusing on what “feeling bad” and 
“deep feelings” mean in behavioral terms guided by several ad 
hoc rules for translating these emotions, again settling on a 
particular rule. 
Consultant: [Offering a rule] So then they're still adhering to 
the assignment, making sure Tommy's on task and making sure 
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what the consequences are, right? But they're not exactly happy 
that it's come to that. 
Social Worker: Pretty much, but they're perfectionists and 
can't seem to handle failure. 
At this point, the discussion shifts levels in rule use from the ad 
hoc presentation of equivalency rules to the invocation of a rule 
about ruling. 
Consultant: [Offers a rule about ruling] Okay, let's not get into 
their heads. [Referring to a “contracted” or formally agreed 
upon at-home behavior modification assignment.] How are the 
parents handling the contract? That's the point. 
Social Worker: They feel they could be doing better. Tommy 
[the child] was never this bad; he was a happy kid until 
recently. What could have changed? As I said, they're 
perfectionists. [Elaborates] 
Consultant: [Offers another rule about ruling] Let's never mind 
that, okay? Feelings aside, they're following through, right? 
Social Worker: That's right. 
As the conversation oscillates between the provision of 
equivalency rules and rules for applying rules, along with the case 
material under consideration, the fluid complexity of the object in 
view—the family—is apparent. Ordinary as this conversation is, 
language use shows that the methodical, the artful, and the 
mundanely essential are working in tandem in assembling the family 
for the purposes at hand. The prepredicative assumption of the 
essential reality of family is unshaken, as those concerned do things 
with words to accomplish, in the practical give-and-take of the here-
and-now, the working contours of Tommy's family life. As discursive 
practice indicates, what family essentially is in one turn at talk is not 
what family essentially is in another. 
What is clear from the Cedarview material is that while the 
prepredicative structures of the lifeworld are important, they are, by 
themselves, of limited value for understanding the constructive 
practices of family as a category of experience. Whatever “pre” there 
is to the lifeworld is attached to experience in diverse ways in the 
immediate schemes of things. How “family” is understood 
experientially is constructed and reconstructed as needed in response 
to situated knowledge and sited responsibilities. Ethnographically 
sensitizing concepts such as experiential location and organizational 
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embeddedness show that the discursive is never just talk and 
interaction. 
Radical or Reflexive? 
Is the Gubrium and Holstein program radical? It has admittedly 
been informed by Schutz and ethnomethodology, and in that regard is 
about the lifeworld, categories of experience, and talk and interaction. 
It appreciates some postmodern sensibilities, such as the fluidity of 
social life (see Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Holstein and Gubrium 
2000b). But, fluidity should not be mistaken for nihilism or the view 
that anything goes. In fact, the program has a good measure of old-
fashioned interest in “things,” their institutional bearings, and how 
related matters are socially organized. 
Beyond family, our program has broadly responded to three 
questions. One is analytic and asks how to develop concepts and a 
vocabulary that help to understand the everyday realities of 
contemporary experience. On this front, we have delved into the 
constructed meanings of personal identity, social problems, inner lives, 
and social worlds. Pragmatist bearings have encouraged us to be 
conceptually lean in this mission, adopting a theoretical minimalism. 
No grand theory of social structure in this corner. 
This has led us to the orderly nooks and crannies of lived 
experience—some as small as informal dyads or groups, and some as 
large as formal organizations—that provide substantive contexts for 
constructing who and what we are. This is equally minimalist; no 
grandiose view of bureaucratic society imposing its rationalities and 
risks on this front. Experience for us refers to what is happening—to 
me, to you, to us, and to them in the simultaneous heres and theres of 
everyday life—some of which is vague, some apparently silent, and 
some loud and clear, even deafening. 
A second question has been procedural. How then do we study 
and document social life? If contemporary experience is organized in 
life's nooks and crannies, it is imperative that we enter into them as 
ethnographic observers to learn what is happening firsthand on site. 
Certainly, we have listened to people, recorded what they have said, 
and in many instances examined that interaction very closely, voice-
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by-voice, turn-by-turn, category-by-category, and theme-by-theme. 
We also have observed, if not heard, patterns of things left unsaid that 
have mattered in organizing what is happening. These, too, have been 
important, crucial to understanding, and as such, we have never 
limited ourselves to the discursive. This is where ethnographic 
sensibility comes in. 
The third question, which emerged later in the program, returns 
us to our point of departure but now with the facts in hand. What has 
the program shown about the lived contours of contemporary life, 
especially about the structure and organization of experience, troubles 
in particular? Where are its lived realities? As far as family is 
concerned, the facts indicate that its contemporary experience is more 
complex and varied than ever—multilocal, methodically organized, and 
constructively fluid. As a category of experience, there is now more 
family than there ever was simply because there are more discursive 
venues—more nooks and crannies—for constructing it. Family's 
experiential locations are seemingly endless, hardly limited to its 
traditional domain, the household. 
What is radical about this? (Radical is a loaded word, so we 
have to be careful here.) Is it radical and therefore of limited value 
because it seriously deals with the discursive? Decidedly not, since the 
constructive dimensions of reality are widely acknowledged and 
accepted. But, let us turn the tables and ask a derivative question. Is 
the program radical because it also centers on the substantive whats 
of these matters? Again, decidedly not. (Why does Ho claim that our 
concern for the discursive is radical, rather than our interest in the 
contextual, more substantive aspects of social construction?) While 
prepredicative structures are typically taken to be assuredly there in 
practice, their practical presence in life requires constructive work, as 
we hope the preceding extract exemplified. Across the board, we have 
consistently argued that the discursive is not the sum total of reality 
construction, just as we have insisted that the circumstances and 
substantive bearings of reality construction are not self-evident 
realities. Perhaps the program is radical because it is reflexive and 
does not fit with someone's ontological preferences. So be it. 
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Notes 
1An “analytics” is different from a theory, although it holds a similar status in 
constructionist approaches as theory does in nonconstructionist 
approaches. Since the activity of assembling and concretizing the real 
and its components is the aim of constructionism, the analytic goal is 
to conceptualize and document the construction process and its 
circumstances. This calls for an analytic vocabulary identifying process 
and circumstance, not a theory about the outcomes of the process. 
2We have been called postmodernist before, usually suggesting that we 
adhere to an approach that is empirically ungrounded (see, for 
example, Prus 1998). While we appreciate many postmodernist 
sensibilities and draw from work by scholars considered 
postmodernist, we have consistently offered an analytic approach that 
attempts to show how concrete social realities are organized (see, for 
example, Gubrium and Holstein 1998). 
3Ho is aware of many of our nonfamily publications (which he liberally cites), 
but the texts appear to be read through the lens of his view of the 
primordial family. 
4The terms “reflexive” and “reflexivity” are used in different ways in sociology. 
We use the terms to convey the mutually constitutive character of 
everyday discursive activity, and the social circumstances and 
resources that provide its substantive bearings. 
5And of course, socialization—the source of habitus—is largely a discursive 
process further raising question about the claim that meaning is 
somehow prediscursive. 
6Bourdieu's (1996) argument that “the family” is a product of the “labor of 
institutionalization” by “the state” stands in contrast with Dorothy 
Smith's more empirically nuanced analysis of the institutional 
reproduction of family. See Smith (1993) for a discussion of the notion 
of the Standard North American Family and Smith (2005) for a broader 
view of her program. 
7There is, perhaps, an explanation for some of our differences with Ho over 
the use of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. Melvin Pollner (2012) has 
recently drawn a distinction between the ethnomethodological program 
that Garfinkel ostensibly founded (along with Pollner, Harvey Sacks, D. 
Lawrence Wieder, Don Zimmerman, and Hugh Mehan, among others) 
and the program that has emerged through Garfinkel's and others' 
(Michael Lynch and Eric Livingston, just to name two) studies of work. 
Pollner has called the earlier version “Ethnomethodology Version 1.0” 
and the latter “Ethnomethodology Version 2.0.” According to Pollner, 
EM 1.0 features making the familiar strange, viewing social action in 
light of seen but unnoticed background features, an abiding concern 
with members' practices, avoiding the confusion of analyst/member 
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concepts, ethnomethodological indifference, a critical yet affiliative 
stance toward sociology, and the pursuit of reflexivity. The more 
recent EM 2.0, according to Pollner, seeks to make the strange 
familiar, focuses on the foreground matters of interest to practitioners, 
values presence (haecceity), tries to avoid the distortion of member-
analyst differentiation, urges ethnomethodological instructiveness, and 
turns away from radical reflexivity. Clearly, our work resonates with 
the earlier version (EM 1.0), especially in its incarnations in the work 
of Pollner, Wieder, Zimmerman, Mehan, Sacks, and others working 
around the edges of Garfinkelian dogma. By virtue of his citations, we 
suspect that Ho would be more inclined to value EM 2.0. 
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